This was a common scenario in the early days of Philippine diplomacy: Our delegation met with its foreign counterpart. We were negotiating, say, a trade agreement or air travel rules. The foreign delegates came with voluminous documents, our delegates had sparse materials.
As to be expected, at some point during the discussions, we ran out of arguments. If we were negotiating with the Americans, we invoked the sufferings we endured in World War II defending the American flag. With the Japanese, we cited the damages and atrocities the Imperial Forces had committed in our country. In both instances, our side had strayed from the topic of the negotiations and cited our cultural value of “utang na loob.”
Then Foreign Secretary Salvador P. Lopez (SP) would remind us not to use utang na loob as part of our negotiating package. SP emphasized that it was a concept alien to other countries, and that even in our own society, its use in government affairs had often led to unwelcome results. He stressed that we did not have to invoke utang na loob if we prepared properly for any negotiation.
Our foreign service officers took to heart SP’s advice. We diligently prepared before we negotiated with other countries.
Thus, when President Duterte cited utang na loob to justify his relations with China on the West Philippine Sea (WPS) issue, he revived a discredited practice in diplomacy. Like our ill-prepared negotiators in the past, Mr. Duterte has run out of arguments to justify his subservient policy to China. The worst part is, he even distorted the utang na loob usage in our culture.
Utang na loob is based on a mutually beneficial relationship. Our relationship with China is hostile. If somebody squats on your property and harvests the resources without your permission, he cannot be your friend. Even among friends, the exchange of benefits must be approximately equal. China exported the COVID-19 virus to us irresponsibly. The virus was already circulating in China; however, it did not promptly ban travel to our country. China must compensate us adequately for our losses, human and economic, for utang na loob to apply. The Sinovac donations are simple tokenism.
Mr. Duterte’s diplomacy is characterized by secrecy and instant decisions, and will create many more problems in the future. His permission allowing the Chinese to fish in other parts of the WPS, in return for China supposedly allowing our fishermen access to Panatag Shoal, is one such example. There is no indication as to when and how we ended up with this agreement. It is the product of secret diplomacy and appears to be a grant in perpetuity of fishing rights to the Chinese without any catch limits. Instead of insisting on the unlimited access of our fishermen to Panatag Shoal based on the ruling of The Hague tribunal, Mr. Duterte made a deal.
It is a lopsided deal. China’s gain is evident: Her vessels can now fish in perpetuity in other parts of the WPS that belong to us. Our loss is massive; our fishing stock will be depleted with Mr. Duterte’s blessing. In the meantime, our fishermen are still banned by China from Panatag Shoal.
All these events happened because the President entered into an agreement with the Chinese without adequate preparation. Had Mr. Duterte not used his “secret and instant diplomacy,” this should have been the scenario: Our side will enter into the negotiations with proper preparations. We will have computer printouts detailing the resources in the WPS, the amounts that can be harvested without depleting aquatic stocks, what species cannot be harvested, what fishing gear can be used, and, most importantly, how long the agreement will last, its duration.
Our career diplomats are properly trained by now on how to form negotiating teams on any topic on short notice. It is unfortunate that the President is not using them properly. Our voters should, in turn, elect politicians who should abide by the rules of diplomacy. Salvador P. Lopez’s reminder to our diplomats is timeless, and is also meant for all Filipinos.
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Hermenegildo C. Cruz is a retired career diplomat who served in the Department of Foreign Affairs for 32 years. He drafted the Foreign Service Act of 1991 and was part of the team that created the current Foreign Service structure under PD 1, the 1972 Reorganization Plan.