Reframing the BARMM transition discourse

The Rapid Midterm Review on the Bangsamoro Transition Period released by the Mindanao Peoples Caucus in October 2020 created a flurry of heated discussions on social media, particularly on the report’s top recommendation to extend the period of transition for another three years. Some fear that the issue has become divisive especially among Bangsamoro peace advocates. It is therefore important to carve a space where, instead of having a “zero-sum” debate between those who are for or against the extension, both sides reframe the discussion to focus on the purpose of the extension and for whom it is intended. Establishing a clear set of parameters to follow during the extension will ensure that the targets will be met while protecting the interests of the Bangsamoro people.

A top priority should be the creation of a roadmap for the period of extension, specifying what should be delivered by whom and when. Developing this roadmap can be an opportunity for a broad set of Bangsamoro stakeholders to come together and agree on what should happen during the extended transition period. It can also be an instrument to establish accountabilities not just from the national government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, but also from civil society organizations, peace advocates, and other parties that have an interest in ensuring the success of the peace process.

Proponents of the roadmap should also define the needed structures and mechanisms to guarantee that the parties involved in delivering the milestones would be able to do so. These mechanisms should draw lessons from what has happened over the past years, particularly on why some deliverables were not completed. This will require the parties to the peace agreement, as well as the various Bangsamoro stakeholders, to take stock of how they can do better during the extension and increase the likelihood that the milestones will be completed. There can also be a broad-based Bangsamoro monitoring system that will track the progress of the milestones, and hold parties to the peace agreement to greater accountability in case such milestones are not delivered.

Moreover, a set of qualification criteria for those who will be appointed to the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) should be established and strictly applied. The past two years provide sufficient lessons on the responsibilities of the BTA and the competences that a member should possess.

There may also be a need to review the composition of the BTA to broaden representation across the various ethnic groups of the Bangsamoro. Another suggestion is to explore the idea of establishing a “hybrid” BTA where several seats will be opened for election. This will address the position of those opposing the extension based on the lack of democratic exercise in the formation of the BTA. Opening some seats to electoral contestation can also allow the Bangsamoro to pilot-test parliamentary elections in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).

Lastly, a provision banning further extension should be inserted in the amendment to the Bangsamoro Organic Law, to guarantee that there would be an unqualified end to the transition period.

In the end, the decision whether to extend the transition must be made to serve the interests of the Bangsamoro people. Given the limited time that the two-year transition period has provided, the people are still in the process of reclaiming their cohesive identity and learning the ropes of self-government for the benefit of the region.

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Luisito G. Montalbo, MBA, is a member of the Board of Trustees of INCITEGov, a policy research and advocacy center in the Philippines. He is also a former undersecretary of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process. This article is an excerpt from a think piece produced with inputs from INCITEGov members Teresita Quintos Deles, Edilberto de Jesus, Yasmin Busman-Lao, Mario Aguja, and Howard Cafugauan. Visit incitegov.org.ph/publications.