What can prodemocracy forces do?
I was invited to give a reading of the political situation to members of Tindig Pilipinas last Saturday; unfortunately, I fell ill and could not make it. I emailed a set of slides summarizing my reading instead. These invitations are another opportunity to take part in the public discourse; as on previous occasions, my remarks, though addressed to a specific audience and based on my understanding of the specific expectations of that audience, are always meant to be public.
Allow me to share the analysis I made from the perspective of prodemocracy forces.
The 2019 midterm elections are the natural point of reference. The results were bad for the opposition: first shutout in Senate elections since 1955 (the midterms of another popular president, Ramon Magsaysay). They were bad for democracy, too: The minority in the Senate has shrunk, at a time of executive chaos, congressional subservience and virtual judicial capture.
But it could have been worse. Good candidates did win local government seats. Despite fanfare and obsessive media coverage, Hugpong failed to deliver (its main financiers lost in massive landslides; the greedy “vote for 13” strategy backfired; Sara Duterte junked Koko Pimentel, who still won). Bam Aquino was not damaged by his respectable loss; and Chel Diokno, with six million votes, became a breakout candidate (but, one must note, on a lower scale than Risa Hontiveros on her first Senate run, where she won 9 million votes).
What helps explain this seemingly dual nature of the midterm results? We are looking at two nations.
The results are reflected in the consistent dichotomy of the surveys: Except for three declines, President Duterte remains broadly popular, as is his signature policy, the “war on drugs.” But over 90 percent of survey respondents consistently say suspects should be arrested alive; over 75 percent say they FEAR they or someone they know will be the next EJK victim; 10 percent or less say they believe the police when the police say a suspect was killed because “nanlaban.”
Another counterpoint to President Duterte’s popularity: A great majority of Filipinos consistently support a more assertive Philippine response to Chinese aggression in the South China Sea
Since the midterms, however, the administration coalition has been consumed by infighting and positional maneuvering: There is the Bong Go faction, which includes Manny Pacquiao and looks set to take over PDP-Laban; there are the Duterte siblings, a faction which has a peculiar dynamic of its own. The GMA alliance is moneyed, organized and competent. The Marcoses are also moneyed but do not have a deep bench.
The Villars are reinvigorated by Cynthia’s overwhelming performance in the Senate elections (most votes ever won by a Filipino politician) and have additional new funds from IPOs and thriving businesses. The NUP is growing fast because it has followed the NPC formula: business-friendly, mainstream politics. The DND/AFP is charting its own course and gaining more power in the process: It continues to align closely with the US military, contrary to President Duterte’s preference; remains a stickler for constitutional procedure (hence RevGov, no; martial law, yes); and makes maximum use of influence by going all out against communism.
The work of prodemocracy forces is cut out for it. This includes (aside from lessons to be drawn from history, technology and demography) these three imperatives:
Avoid “purity politics.” The truth of the situation is that prodemocracy forces of all stripes must come together to fight in a common front—and the criteria for unity must be as few as possible. The so-called “call-out culture” and “cancel culture” are counterproductive; instead of prodemocracy forces creating more allies, they are creating more hostiles.
Allow me to speak plainly. Prodemocracy forces must learn from Mar Roxas’ debacle in 2019: his absurd belief in the “air war,” active campaigning against two fellow candidates, studied ignorance of the rest of the slate and of the opportunities in working with them.
Defend against China. This remains the strongest wedge issue against the Duterte administration, and it has the advantage of being a longstanding concern (since at least 2012). Linking the “war on drugs” to the Chinese drug trade is not only an exercise in truth-telling; many Filipinos are outraged by these Chinese excesses.
Evade “distraction” trap. A common unit of analysis these days is “distraction.” The administration is supposedly strategic enough to create distractions, to keep popular opinion confused and tame. IT ISN’T TRUE. This administration is not strategically-minded enough to create distraction after distraction — the screw-ups are the inevitable fruit of executive chaos.
And the principles of psychology teach us that linking a screw-up with an individual or an institution colors our perception of that individual or institution. Is the Mayor Sanchez screw-up a distraction from some other calamity? No. It is a calamity itself. The more it is associated with the admin, the more the first mayor’s stain colors the second mayor’s government.
On Twitter: @jnery_newsstand, email: [email protected]
