Not enough
The language of the Chairman’s Statement issued at the end of the 30th Asean Summit held in the Philippines was disappointing; it failed to press the advantage a host traditionally enjoys in Asean summitry, which is the framing of shared concerns. But it wasn’t a total loss.
The statement did not highlight the historic arbitral tribunal ruling on the South China Sea, which gave a small country like the Philippines a clear diplomatic and legal victory over a great power like China, but it did include, in the seventh paragraph of a 124-paragraph communique, a reference to the international treaty which made that landmark ruling possible.
“We reaffirmed the shared commitment to maintaining and promoting peace, security and stability in the region, as well as to the peaceful resolution of disputes, including full respect for legal and diplomatic processes, without resorting to the threat or use of force, in accordance with the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos).”
This is an important concession, and we can understand the process of rationalization that must have convinced the country’s diplomats to let a passage like this suffice (instead of a more sharply worded message to the dragon in the room).
But in the two paragraphs devoted to the still-simmering disputes in parts of the South China Sea, the Philippines as host declined to press its advantage—to the post-summit chagrin of its traditional allies, both those with a stake in the disputes like Indonesia (by far the largest economy and most heavily populated member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and those without, like Singapore (a country small in size but with considerable influence in the region).
Paragraph 120 includes the following: “We reaffirmed the importance of the need to enhance mutual trust and confidence, exercising self-restraint in the conduct of activities, and avoiding actions that may further complicate the situation, and pursuing the peaceful resolution of disputes, without resorting to the threat or use of force.”
Paragraph 121, in its entirety, reads as follows: “We underscored the importance of the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in its entirety. We took note of the improving cooperation between Asean and China. We welcomed the progress to complete a framework of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) by middle of this year, in order to facilitate the early conclusion of an effective COC. We recognized the long-term benefits that would be gained from having the South China Sea as a sea of peace, stability and sustainable development.”
Using the initial comparative analysis done by Rand Corporation analyst Lyle Morris, we can see that:
Unlike in 2014 or 2016, there was no expression of concern over China’s aggressive land reclamation campaign in both the Spratlys and the Paracels.
Unlike in 2015 or 2016, there was no statement warning against militarization or escalation—either of which describes China’s land reclamation and facility-building binge.
Unlike in 2015 or 2016, there was no passage candidly declaring the erosion of trust because of China’s aggressive build-up in the region.
There is the reinforced call to finally make good on the decade-old commitment to forge a Code of Conduct, with the framework for the COC expected to be completed by the middle of the year. There is the repeated assurance of the freedom of navigation and of over-flights. And—another passage of rationalization—there is the expression taking note of the concerns of some leaders about the South China Sea disputes—as in 2015 and 2016.
As we said, not a total loss. Now the focus must turn to the completion of the framework that will finally lead to the COC; that has much less room for appeasement or rationalization.
