The squad: Philippines and ‘Big 3’ allies
The Indo-Pacific region is fast emerging as the center of global geopolitical gravity. And the Philippines is right at the heart of this seismic transformation in the 21st century by, inter alia, becoming the only Southeast Asian nation to openly defy China’s hegemonic ambitions and, crucially, joining the new “squad” of the United States, Australia, and Japan in recent months.
Only two years ago, the place of our nation in the evolving regional landscape was a big question mark. The shallowness of our strategic discourse was on plain display during a presidential debate—the only one the eventual winner bothered to attend—where foreign policy was an unusual area of focus. Among the salient issues was the emergence of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, better known as the “Quad,” composed of Australia, Japan, the US, and India.
Around the same time, I headed to Europe for a series of engagements from Berlin to Paris. My primary destination, however, was the Munich Security Conference, where I raised a question about the nature of the Quad during a panel that featured top officials from all four powers.
Curiously, the panel was opened by the French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, who was ostensibly still in a foul mood on the heels of the major diplomatic rupture between Paris and Canberra over the latter’s abrupt cancellation of a multibillion submarine deal with the French Naval Group in favor of Anglo-American alternative under the AUKUS (Australia-UK-US) alliance.
Both the cadence and content of Le Drian’s speech (especially when listened to in French) evinced Paris’ displeasure at the overall state of the trans-Atlantic alliance. What I didn’t anticipate, however, was the unusually self-assured if not pugnacious response by India’s chief diplomat, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, who seemingly took offense to my question.
In particular, I asked if Quad is the new “Asian Nato.” I had expected a categorical rejection from the panelists, but not the kind of influencer-style riposte from the formerly soft-spoken diplomat.
“I would urge you not to slip into that lazy analogy of an Asian-Nato. It isn’t because there are three countries who are treaty allies. We are not a treaty ally. It doesn’t have a treaty, a structure, a secretariat, it’s a kind of 21st-century way of responding to a more diversified, dispersed world,” he thundered in response to my question. “Quad is a grouping of four countries who have common interests, common values, great deal of comfort, who happen to be located in the four corners of the Indo-Pacific,” he added, leaving little room for further discussion for the rest of the panel, who opted to just stay silent following the spirited intervention by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s global spokesman.
The true significance of Jaishankar’s spirited intervention came to light a few days later when Russia invaded Ukraine. Instead of siding with fellow democracies in the West or a fellow post-colonial nation (Ukraine), India refused to condemn Moscow’s actions in the United Nations and even doubled down on its trade with and, most especially, energy imports from Russia at huge discounts.
When confronted by the West over the issue, Jaishankar accused them of hypocrisy and insisted on India’s developmental imperatives. He often also brandished the Global South card, presenting India as a leader of the non-Western world seeking a new multipolar order. In short, there is neither an “alliance” with the West nor any “alignment” in terms of values and vision for a rules-based international order.
Under the guise of “multi-alignment,” India—after spending decades on the margins of the global power play—is bent on pursuing its own “great power moment.” Now contrast this to the Philippines, which has consistently condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in relevant UN votes; happens to be the US’ third ally with significant defense entwinement vis-à-vis Australia and Japan; and is, crucially, more interested in preserving the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific than seeking a new “multipolar order” that could inadvertently aid regional hegemony of the likes of China, Russia, or India.
The joint patrols among the four allies last month and the recently-concluded meeting of defense ministers from the US, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines is likely the beginning of a new “Asian Nato” with 21st-century characteristics if China continues with its hegemonic behavior.
