THE Commission on Elections proposes early voting for trouble spots like Maguindanao in the 2010 elections. At first blush, this is a good idea. Early elections will give deputized forces like the police a chance to focus on securing precincts in ?hot spots.? The attention and resources of the government can be devoted to maintaining peace and order. And it will have the collateral benefit of depriving election fixers?including warlords selling votes wholesale to national candidates eager to subvert the results of the voting?of the opportunity to sell blocs of votes to losers hell-bent on cheating their way to victory.
However there is an accompanying risk. The same warlords?either in league with or taking advantage of an administration that needs to produce results benefiting a coalition fighting for its political future?can deliberately provoke trouble. The disturbances would prompt the Comelec to classify warlord territories as areas requiring early elections. Get enough early elections scheduled in enough areas declared hot spots, and the elections might be decided even before they are held in the rest of the nation.
This is because warlords are plugged into the national political network; and the ruling coalition, for one, which continues to feature warlords in its roster of senior (including regional) officers, enjoys the advantage of intelligence. That is, its network of officials can provide the national leadership with an insight into how the elections may be trending; a counter-trend, then, could be established by means of early elections.
As with any good idea, the devil is in the details. An idea?s usefulness to our ongoing democratic project must also be determined by the manner in which it is implemented. For the Comelec?s proposal to be seriously considered, it has to lay down parameters that reflect a broad consensus and don?t overly rely on the judgement of the Chief Executive, which is liable to impairment due to partisan considerations.
Most of all, the benefits of early elections in specific localities must be balanced by a corresponding appreciation of the effects of early elections on the credibility of the national elections. The Comelec will have to rely to a certain extent on the information provided it by local governments, the military and the police. Yet all three are in the same situation as the Comelec itself: not wholly trusted by the public, because they have yet to prove, conclusively, that they are capable of turning their backs on the manner by which all these institutions were compromised in the 2004 and 2007 elections.
We would prefer a broad consensus?on the specific localities that would benefit from early elections and on the safeguards the Comelec can put in place?to make the criteria for classifying specific electoral hot spots. And citizens? electoral watchdog groups must be allowed or given adequate time and opportunities to send teams to observe elections in these areas.
Aside from a broad public consensus on early elections, there needs to be a political consensus, as well. It would be disastrous for early elections to be called for, only for the process to be derailed due to wranglings in the courts; or worse, for expectations to be built up, only for legal surprises to emerge, such as the need for special legislation.
There will be very little opposition, we believe, for early elections to be scheduled in Maguindanao. The real question is whether Basilan, Agusan and other areas currently plagued by security problems will be included; or if an epidemic of lawlessness would ensue, stampeding the authorities into demanding that a multitude of provinces hold early elections.
The process begins with the Comelec; but it must lay its cards on the table and detail the means and methods, and the decision-making process it intends to follow to determine which provinces will have to undertake early elections. We do not dismiss the strong possibility that judiciously used, early elections could be a powerful means to thwart cheating and corruption in the voting and the counting.