MANILA, Philippines—Over the years, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has determined the parameters that govern her domestic freedom of action, politically, when it comes to relations with the United States. These parameters are pretty broad: so long as no overt dictatorship is established, the appearance of democracy retained, and human rights excesses tempered, and so long as the United States is granted virtual carte blanche in Mindanao, Ms Arroyo can do pretty much as she pleases.

The consequences of these parameters have ensured the President’s continued hold on power while denying her the ultimate fruits of her relentless and remorseless pursuit of transactional politics: the liquidation of the legal Left and perpetuating herself and her coalition in power. Her only consolation may be that it is not only her government that has to toe the Washington line.

The CPP-NPA has found its fund-raising efforts overseas hampered by the global tightening on money for organizations frowned upon by the West; and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front has found its actions hemmed in by the partnership, more or less, established by the United States and Australia within the Asean region: with that comes a kind of broad consensus that independence as a goal would be impolitic for the MILF to pursue, as would anything giving the impression that it is coddling terrorism within areas it considers its territory. In return, aside from focusing its aid and assistance on Muslim Mindanao, the Americans have also given diplomatic encouragement to efforts to secure broad autonomy for the Moros.

The kidnapping of Fr. Michael Sinnott, however, threatened to upset this finely tuned balance of competing interests, at a time when the resurgence of terrorism in Indonesia—now America’s main ally in Asean—has refocused American efforts to foster what it considers a more secular-minded bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism in the region. To appear to be participating in, or coddling, terrorists or kidnappers—and to diminish, in turn, the ongoing investment in improving conditions in Mindanao as a whole—might lead to diminishing American enthusiasm for a peace deal with the MILF as the focal point of Moro aspirations.

And yet up to the point of Sinnott’s release from captivity, officials like Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno insisted the MILF had a hand in the kidnapping of the Irish missionary. On the other hand, were the Armed Forces of the Philippines to continue to appear impotent at maintaining peace and order in Mindanao, it might lead to a reexamination of the existing relationship between the Philippine and American defense establishments.

It was therefore highly convenient for nearly all parties concerned—rebel and government—to resolve the kidnapping of Sinnott ahead of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Manila, itself a manifestation of that other parameter America is insistent upon: the maintenance of the “showcase of democracy” identity of the country. All the parties concerned were suitably rewarded.

Clinton refrained from embarrassing the present administration, making only muted references to the human rights situation, and holding back from highlighting corruption beyond a tacit endorsement of the importance of whistle-blowers in fighting corruption. At the same time, she continued to push forward the scuttled peace agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF, asking both to go back to the negotiating table.

Both parties anointed, the only group left out is the one Father Sinnott himself said kidnapped him: the so-called “original lumad,” contrary to the government’s view as expressed by Puno, who still says the MILF was behind the abduction. Either Sinnott is right—which only highlights a festering complication in the Christian-Muslim divide in Mindanao (overlooking the ancestral claims of the lumad)—or the least powerful group has become the fall guy in a face-saving resolution to what could have been an embarrassment for both the MILF and the government.

With neither side able to fully master events in Mindanao, the American position as arbiter of balance of power can only strengthen in turn.