THE HONDURAN Constitution is emphatic and unyielding in its provisions concerning constitutional amendments: they can only be put forward by the legislature; there can be no amendment to change the manner amendments may be proposed or accepted; and under no circumstances can the president?s single four-year term be changed, nor can an incumbent president be permitted to succeed himself in office; and no amendments can be proposed changing the form of government.

But Honduran President Manuel Zelaya tried the constitutionally impossible: the lifting of the presidential term limit. Knowing that the legislature ? including some of his supporters ? opposed his self-serving proposal (which made even an attempt to introduce the amendment impossible in the legislature), he tried to mobilize public opinion instead, by pursuing the path of an informal ? because incompatible with existing constitutional processes ? referendum.

The Supreme Court of Honduras acted and ordered the cancellation of the referendum. Zelaya ignored the order and continued with the preparations. Faced with the Supreme Court?s order, the Honduran military refused to distribute the ballots ? and so Zelaya removed the head of the army from his post. At this point, the Supreme Court stepped in again and instructed the armed forces to detain Zelaya.

It was at this point that the world got to know there was a crisis going on in Honduras and the military sent Zelaya into exile. The Honduran Congress then formally deposed Zelaya and installed an interim president ?to serve out the remaining five months of Zelaya?s term, maintaining the schedule for presidential polls.

A kind of frenzy greeted Zelaya when he began speaking from exile, one triggered by a continent-wide trauma with military dictatorships, and further fueled by the wave of Left-leaning populism that has swept the region. Right or Left, all democratically elected governments in the region don?t want a return to those days that had the military exercising a veto over civilian authority. And there is a large ? and growing ?constituency that views the ouster of Zelaya as part of a last-ditch effort by conservative elements, backed by the United States, to assert their vanishing clout.

Politicians of whatever ideological stripes are wont to engage in opportunism ? as timing and circumstances permit. In this sense, Zelaya has no one but himself to blame for giving his successor, Roberto Micheletti, a defeated rival who was aching to gain power, a chance. The collective embrace that has greeted Zelaya in exile was not one his own countrymen would have understood ? his popularity ratings were deep in the cellar, on par with those of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in our country. He was basically despised by 70 percent of his people.

But now, the opinion surveys show Honduran society, pretty united in disliking the ousted president, deeply divided on the legitimacy of his ouster. A plurality (46 percent) disapproves of his removal; 41 percent approves; and 13 percent doesn?t want to venture an opinion. The disliked Zelaya has all sides in Latin America recognizing him as the de jure president of his country; the de facto government has had to agree to go to the bargaining table, with Costa Rica?s President Oscar Arias trying to broker a compromise?so far, unsuccessfully.

It may be that Zelaya?s unpopularity misled his enemies ? and his supporters who were concerned that he was succumbing to the disturbing trend among Latin American presidents to maneuver their perpetuation in office ? into thinking that the public would meet his ouster with relief. But they forgot his unpopularity stemmed in large part from his refusing to submit to the iron-clad rules of Honduras? constitution. Had the political class, as a whole, dug in its heels, the problem of Zelaya?s ambitions would have solved itself in five months, when his term shall have expired. And the military could have stayed in its barracks instead of acting as the Supreme Court?s police.