MANILA, Philippines—From its lair, the MILF issued an appeal—to Malaysia. Time is running out for Kuala Lumpur to respond to the request made by the MILF two days ago. The official MILF website, Luwaran.com had referred to “strong leader” Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, its chair, as having met with the head of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) at “Camp Darapanan” last Aug. 22. The MILF had pointed out that the IMT (at the time) only had less than 10 days left before its tour of duty ended. During that time, according to the MILF timetable, the controversial GRP-MILF MOA was supposed to have been concluded and a justification for the extension of the IMT’s tour provided.

The MILF also expected to be given representation in the Organization of the Islamic Conference and possibly the eclipsing of its rival MNLF by then. The intervention of our Supreme Court derailed the signing of the MOA (causing its postponed signing to tomorrow, the 25th, a virtual impossibility); and fighting in Mindanao now puts MILF forces (now being pushed back by the AFP) in a lose-lose position.

It either has to make a last stand—with no compelling reason for the otherwise sympathetic Malaysians to turn political support into military assistance—or escalate the violence to other parts of the Philippines by means of terrorism, which would alienate hitherto sympathetic parties like the United States, Australia and Japan.

At a time when the future of the current Malaysian government is uncertain, and Anwar Ibrahim is seriously being mentioned as the next Malaysian prime minister—which means Malaysian officialdom has to prepare for a more sympathetic (to Philippine, not MILF, interests) policy environment there—the MILF’s leadership is caught between clinging to an unsigned agreement and having to fight. So now, the MILF—or, to be precise, the faction of its leadership that had hoped to negotiate its way to peace—needs some sort of sign from Malaysia. Otherwise, as Ebrahim said Saturday, “We will continue our struggle in whatever form.”

Certainly both Malaysia and other interested powers do not want a full-blown jihad to break out in Mindanao, which would put them under pressure to publicly denounce the MILF or the Philippine government. In other words, to take sides instead of playing both sides. Malaysia’s uncomfortable position, for example, is also being felt, in its own way, by the United States.

For some years now the United States has devoted modest but (by Philippine standards) significant aid to Mindanao, focused primarily on Moro areas, to build goodwill and a kind of alternative political infrastructure. We say alternative, because it aims to cultivate ties with local officials. In contrast to its previous policy of buttering up an administration that proved itself to be an unreliable ally in Iraq, it has discovered that cultivating local bigwigs results in more dependable relationships. Add to this Washington’s far-from-discreet support for federalism, which ties into this policy of securing American interests without being held hostage to the whims of whoever happens to sit in Malacañang.

Manila has been pliable in allowing the Americans to do as they please—militarily-speaking—in Mindanao. This has had a noticeable effect in disrupting the activities of more radical Moro groups such as the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The MILF has seen this and played a double game of its own, sending positive feelers to the Americans (pointedly distancing itself from the Abu Sayyaf and JI), who returned the favor by keeping the MILF out of its list of terrorists. The MILF even said it was open to the prospects of American bases in Moro areas in the future. Malaysia noticed this and tried to oppose American participation in the peace process.

Our national government has been hampered in negotiating with the MILF because the latter obviously enjoyed the patronage of Malaysia and the tacit blessings of Washington. The Malaysian and American governments may have (faultily, it turns out) assumed that the administration had so thoroughly neutralized all dissent and enfeebled public opinion, that it could brazen its way past any objections to the MOA. The government miscalculated. True to form, it clumsily wiggled its way out of the MOA, leaving the MILF factions favorable to a negotiated peace in a lurch, where they’re now pleading for Kuala Lumpur and Washington to throw them a rescue rope.

Meanwhile, Filipinos have seen America’s gambit and will be hard-pressed to view anything—except an explicit statement of support for our country—coming from it without suspicion.