MANILA, Philippines - God (or the devil, depending on which source one uses) is proverbially in the details. We believe we reflect public opinion when we throw our support behind the peace talks with the secessionist Moro Islamic Liberation Front. But the fine print of the Memorandum of Agreement scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur today gives us serious pause. In that, we believe we are mirroring public sentiment too.

It may not be in the country’s best interests to sign the MOA, as currently written, today. At the very least, the Arroyo administration owes the nation an explanation; it is not enough for the new presidential adviser on the peace process to simply say that “we are not giving [Mindanao] away.” The administration must first build the case for the peace-agreement-in-the-making, considering its inexplicable failure to consult the very local government officials it numbers among its staunchest allies and especially because some provisions of the MOA scheduled to be signed today are deeply problematic.

We realize that the on-again, off-again negotiations have already stretched over a decade; we recognize the danger that further delay will embolden some MILF factions to choose the certainty of renewed war over the emasculating uncertainty of prolonged negotiations. But we also share the public’s intuitive grasp of the fundamentals of peace-making: only an honorable peace can last.

Will the MOA lead to an honorable peace?

The point of reference for our answer must be the 1996 peace pact with the Moro National Liberation Front. This is not to say that the agreement with the MILF, when it is finally concluded, should merely be a recapitulation of the MNLF pact; we understand the MILF’s need to learn from the lessons of history and forge an improved compact. Indeed, the government’s negotiating panel should take into account current realities too.

The problem is not with supposed concessions like the provisions for a separate legislature or a regional security force. Their precedents are in the Organic Act that created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in 1989. (In that Act, the regional security force is actually a unit of the Philippine National Police.)

The problem is not entirely about the ancestral domain issue either; again, the Organic Act already set the precedent. (To be sure, the Act does not categorically state, as the MOA does, that all ancestral domains are not public domain.)

The problem, the issue that needs clarifying, revolves around the use of certain political assumptions. In both the Organic Act and the 1996 peace agreement with the MNLF, for example, the identification of the “National Government” is unambiguous. Any reader would know that the statute and the agreement conformed to current political realities. In the MOA, however, the term “National Government” which has served the country well in various peace negotiations has been replaced with the vague “central government.” This makes sense only in the context of a constitutionally mandated transition to federalism. There are excellent arguments for such a radical change of government, but none of them can disguise the fact that federalism is not a current political reality.

Another example: The MOA grants the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (the provisional name for what the MOA envisions to be ARMM-plus) an extraordinary power. “The Bangsamoro juridical entity is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries; provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; provided, further that it shall remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government to take charge of external defense.” The MOA even envisions the setting up of foreign missions for the new entity, and the participation of delegations from the new entity in Asean and other international assemblies.

In contrast, the ARMM Organic Act expressly excludes both “foreign affairs” and “foreign trade” from the list of devolved powers granted to the ARMM regional government.

There may be a good rationale for this extraordinary grant, but we don’t see it. The national government must explain what this and like concessions mean, before it signs any MOA.