MANILA, Philippines—More on the good apples and bad apples in the Court of Appeals, before I segue into my main topic.
First, a correction: There are apparently 27 so-called good apples and 20 (not 24) bad apples there. Which means that the ratio of good to bad is higher than it was made out to be last week—no longer 53-47, but 57-43. Let me also explain that what happened was that the list of justices came with check marks and x-marks. I assumed that the list had 51 names so that after counting the check marks (for good apples), I just subtracted 27 from 51 instead of counting the x-marks (for bad apples). It turns out, however, that there were only 47 names in the list. My apologies.
Then there is the gender perspective: While 36 percent of the justices in Manila are females, 55 percent of those considered good apples are females, i.e., only 10 percent (two out of 20) of those considered bad apples are women. Which suggests that appointing females to fill the current vacancies in the Court of Appeals may kill two birds with one stone: correcting the lopsided male-female ratio, and (it is hoped) increasing the ratio of good to bad apples in the Court of Appeals barrel.
It is noteworthy that the recent Court of Appeals division that ruled in favor of Luisito Q. Gonzalez and Antonio Buenaflor in their case against then Acting Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera, the “heirs” of Federico C. Delgado (the quotes will be explained later) and Annalisa D. Pesico, was an all-woman division. And all three members happen to be in the “good apples” list. Not only are they not bribable; apparently any approach to them that has even the faintest whiff of an attempt to influence is dealt with severely. Which means that the Gonzalez case was decided solely on its merits. What a refreshing change from other cases, suspected of being decided for monetary or power considerations.
The decision, penned by Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando, ordered all charges against Gonzalez, et al., quashed and dismissed. And it was not kind at all to Devanadera who, as acting secretary of justice, had overturned (with unusual alacrity—see my columns of March 29 and April 14) the ruling of Acting City Prosecutor of Manila Cielitolindo A. Luyun that the complaints for murder and frustrated murder against Gonzalez and Buenaflor, brought out by the “heirs” of Federico Delgado, be dismissed for lack of probable cause. Here are excerpts of the decision in regard to Devanadera’s position:
“It is at once apparent that public respondent Acting Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera did not really dwell on the essential facts of the case, much less dig through the crucial details of private respondent Pesico’s account. Curiously, a close reading ... reveals that except for the rather sweeping finding that private respondent Pesico ‘positively identified’ the petitioners, most of it were restatements, without more, of broad principles and presumptions in criminal law…. Such disposition utterly falls short of the admonitions enunciated in Salonga and reiterated in Allado. Indeed, while probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused’s constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges. The flaw in public respondent … assailed resolution becomes even more magnified when taken in the light of the petitioners’ constitutional right to be presumed innocent. Thus, viewed from a constitutional perspective, it is as if the petitioners were condemned to suffer the hardship of trial, simply because their evidence is weak and they have only alibi and denial to offer.”
Fernando did not use words like “careless” or “negligent” in describing Devanadera’s actions, but her descriptions amounted to the same thing. Fernando figuratively tore apart the identification made by Pesico, as well as her credibility, going into great detail in the process. Fernando instead gave more credit to the sworn statements of 29 impartial and disinterested witnesses (medical personnel of the Neuro Psychiatric Unit of the Makati Medical Center) who corroborated Gonzalez’s whereabouts when Delgado’s murder took place.
What a joy to have a decision where any suspicion of irregularity does not arise. Until the rotten apples in the Court of Appeals barrel are removed, we can at least derive comfort that justice can prevail.
Now for the explanation to why I put the “heirs” of Rico Delgado in quotes. Apparently, neither Delgado’s siblings nor Ana Pesico has any right to call themselves heirs. An article in the Sunday Inquirer two weeks ago, by Rico Delgado’s former wife (marriage annulled at the request of Rico’s parents), stated unequivocally (allegedly based on a Supreme Court decision) that Delgado’s only heirs are his legitimate twin daughters. Which means that collateral relatives, which include brothers and sisters, may not be considered heirs. And since only heirs can be considered to be offended parties, with the right to intervene (e.g., as private complainants), it would seem that the pleadings of the Delgado siblings and Ana Pesico, which resulted in the incarceration of Louie Gonzalez for almost two months now, had absolutely no legal leg to stand on.
How’s that for a twist? Karma?
