Despite the inauguration of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in November 1990, a technical state of belligerency still existed between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and other Muslim groups, on the one hand, and the government of the Philippines, on the other. While the MNLF was a shadow of its former self, it still represented a well-organized force that was skeptical of the prospects of the government making a serious effort to right historical wrongs.
The Philippines, however, with its newly restored democracy and increasingly cordial relations with Middle Eastern states managed to earn the goodwill of Saudi Arabia and other members of the Organization of Islamic Conference, which declared themselves interested in a settlement of the relatively dormant conflict. When the Philippines’ traditional ally, Indonesia, made itself available as an honest broker, events quickly took place which resulted in a historic peace agreement.
By 1993, negotiations between the MNLF and the Philippine government resulted in a ceasefire which effectively ended the state of on-again, off-again civil war which had engulfed Mindanao for a generation.
Finally, after exhaustive conferences abroad and panel talks in the Philippines, on Sept. 2, 1996, the government under President Fidel V. Ramos and the MNLF, represented by its leader Chairman Nur Misuari, signed a comprehensive peace agreement in Jakarta, Indonesia. The 28-year-old war was at last, officially, over.
Misuari’s MNLF came to head a new Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), which oversaw 14 provinces for three years and worked toward autonomy for (at least) four Muslim provinces by means of a plebiscite in 1999. By the late 1990s, 7,000 of the 17,000 MNLF guerrillas had been integrated into the army and the police. Misuari had effectively become an official of the Philippine republic, responsible for articulating the interests of Muslim Filipinos. The war leader became a leader of peace—and then turned out to be a leader who was no different from his disappointing Christian counterparts.
The fact remains though that the bold experiment represented by the SPCPD represents one of the most outstanding achievements of the Ramos administration. There is a delicious irony in the fact that a president, who spent his entire career in the Philippine military and for whom the MNLF and most Muslims have had no reason to feel affection, had achieved the peace long eagerly sought but never achieved by his predecessors.
Ramos also worked to boost Mindanao’s share of the national budget, from nine percent during the Corazon Aquino years to roughly 30 percent during his term (at present, it is down to nine percent again).
The challenges facing the Muslims and Christians in Mindanao are still daunting. But the paramount desire of all the leaders in Mindanao—for economic growth in all the provinces and increased and sustained opportunities for progress for all sectors—at least had a fighting chance in the 1990s because the prerequisite for the achievement of all these, peace and order, existed.
But even as we look at the legacy of the Ramos years, we need to look back even further to the origins of the Moros insisting they’ve never been Filipinos.
* * *
The scene was dramatic. The session hall of the Constitutional Convention, decorated with Filipino and American flags, was brightly lit with klieg lights. The hall itself was filled to capacity. Microphones were conspicuous, as the event that was about to take place was going to be broadcast over the radio. The date was Feb. 19, 1935.
At 35 minutes past 3 in the afternoon, a portly gentleman wearing a bow tie stood up at the speaker’s rostrum and banged a gavel, signifying the opening of the Convention’s last session. The gentleman was the President of the Convention, Claro M. Recto. Beside him was Quintin Paredes. They were soon joined by Manuel Roxas.
The secretary of the Convention then began calling upon the delegates to sign. Recto signed first. One delegate, Gregorio Perfecto of Manila, who was recovering from a paralytic attack, limped up to the secretary’s table to sign the official copies—in English and Spanish—of the new Constitution. Perfecto was assisted by one of his daughters, and signed the documents with his own blood. Another delegate, Jose Zurbito of Masbate province, had been ill for months but managed to show up. Other delegates signed with special gold pens or pens of historical significance.
Only one delegate did not sign: Tomas Cabili. The delegate from the southern province of Lanao, did not sign the 1935 Constitution because he did not vote in favor of it—the only delegate to vote no. During the Convention he had worked for Mindanao to have the right to vote for its own representatives, which up till then had been appointed by the governor-general of the Philippines. According to Delegate Jose Aruego, who later wrote the definitive account of the convention, Cabili was convinced that “the province of Lanao—except Sulu and Cotobato—should have been permitted by constitutional provision to have its... representatives elected by the direct vote of the people.”
Aruego wrote: “Partly because of his efforts, the Constitution as approved by the Convention, on second reading, included a provision permitting all legislators from the island [of Mindanao] to be elected by the direct vote of the people. The Special Committee on Style, however... so amended the Constitution that the representatives of Lanao, together with those from the Mountain Province, Sulu and Cotobato, should be selected in a manner to be determined by law. Delegate Cabili fought hard in the closing days of the Convention to give the people of Lanao the right to [vote] but his efforts were in vain.”
(To be continued)
