President Obama’s pirouettes in Asia
Seven months ago, in October 2013 amid the US government shutdown, President Barack Obama decided to cancel his then-planned trips to Asia. Now the trip has taken place.
Yet, bearing in mind the global geopolitical and economic stakes in the Asia Pacific, the trip must clearly be deemed a quite alarming flop.
To see why, let us take the trip’s destinations—Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines—in reverse order.
In Manila, the trip’s final destination, arguably the most concrete outcome of the pirouettes occurred in the shape of a 10-year defense pact (called the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement). The Philippines, a former US colony, ejected American troops stationed there just some 20 years ago. Now, they are being welcomed back.
Obama was quoted as saying about the pact: “Our goal is not to counter China. Our goal is not to contain China.”
One can be forgiven for thinking that perhaps this is a case of he who protests too much actually confesses to the underlying charge. After all, China is decidedly also not among the partners the US side envisions under the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership).
Obama’s previous stop was in Malaysia. It was also a somewhat embarrassing time to be in Kuala Lumpur, not least in light of the Malaysian government’s persecution of opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim on allegations of sodomy. Not a memorable visit on any count.
The visit to South Korea occurred at a time of one of the country’s greatest recent tragedies, with the death by drowning of hundreds of school pupils, and others, from the ferry disaster. It was not the proper occasion for detailed discussions. Hence, a key subject, Korea joining the TPP, was set aside.
Apart from expressing his condolences, Obama also reassured Seoul that the United States would stand behind the South Koreans in case of conflict with the North. No great new development there.
He stood by the Japanese (see below) on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands issue with China, but he interestingly chose not to say anything about the Dokdo/Takeshima islands dispute between South Korea and Japan.
While both Japan and South Korea are military allies of the United States, tensions run high, thereby jeopardizing peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Obama’s various interventions may have brought the temperature down a degree or two. However, there is no solid outcome from his brief stay in Seoul on that count—or, it seems, any other.
The greatest disappointment was Obama’s visit to Tokyo. The year 2015 will mark the 70th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War. Within a few short years of the kamikaze attacks and the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan and the United States became allies, with America in the role of Japan’s benevolent protector.
The principal reason back then? You guessed it, to contain China. The latter, of course, had been America’s World War II ally, but had in the meantime “fallen” to communism. Thusly, the ally (China) became the archenemy—and the erstwhile archenemy (Japan) became the principal ally.
As to the current territorial disputes, the Cairo declaration (1943) reaffirmed by Potsdam (1945) had made it explicitly clear that the Diaoyu (Senkaku in Japanese) islands were to be restored to China.
Even so, Obama asserted that they were covered in the US-Japan Security Treaty (1952). Hence, should the Chinese choose to invade the islands, the United States would defend. A murky situation is made murkier and more perilous.
Territorial and defense matters aside, the great prize of what was heralded to be a pivotal visit from the leader of the world’s biggest economy to the world’s third-biggest was supposed to be an agreement between the two on the TPP.
Japan and the United States are the two great whales in the TPP, with the other 10 members (Canada, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei) medium- or small-sized fish.
An agreement between Japan and the United States is essential to concluding the TPP. It should serve to entice other Asian nations, such as South Korea and Indonesia, to join—while containing China, of course.
Extremely intense negotiating between the countries’ respective trade ministers and schmoozing between President Obama and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe over an outrageously expensive, sake-lubricated sushi dinner failed to achieve a breakthrough. (The main obstacle is agriculture.)
Though both sides said progress had been made—they would, wouldn’t they?—in reality, Obama left empty-handed.
Thus, the Obama trip, which, after its earlier cancellation, has now happened. It leaves the world pretty much in the same place as if it had not happened.
There is no greater clarity emerging from the trip for global trade policy. Nor is it clear that, for all the careful stage management and the mellifluous words being uttered, the issue of the US commitment to the Asia Pacific region, its reliability, or more generally its global credibility, has been clarified.
And the Chinese? They are probably sorting out whether the Obama trip leaves them more contained—or less contained.
Copyright 2014 by The Globalist
Jean-Pierre Lehmann is a contributing editor to The Globalist and a visiting professor at Hong Kong University.
