Southeast Asia gets ‘Trumped’?
Singapore—With his shocking victory in the US presidential election, Donald Trump has made a lot of people very afraid. In fact, his rise threatens to incite a revolution that shakes the foundations not only of American politics, but also of global peace and prosperity. One region that is likely to start feeling tremors soon is Southeast Asia.
Throughout his campaign, Trump espoused an “America first” worldview, emphasizing that he would follow through on US international commitments only when it suits him. This would represent a notable reversal from the last eight years, during which US President Barack Obama made a concerted effort to deepen America’s ties with Southeast Asia.
Under Obama’s stewardship, the United States acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and joined the East Asia Summit; became the first Asean dialogue partner to establish a permanent mission to the organization (2013); and forged a strategic partnership with Asean (2015). And earlier this year, Obama hosted the first US-Asean summit on American soil and brought four Asean members into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a mega-regional trade deal that would promote US economic exchange with the region.
Obama’s efforts in Southeast Asia were all part of his broader strategic “pivot” to Asia. Aimed at helping the United States to maintain its strategic primacy in the Asia-Pacific region, the policy has been quietly welcomed by most regional actors, as it dovetails with their desire to check China’s hegemonic ambitions in the region.
All of this may be about to change. Trump is likely to focus overwhelmingly on domestic issues, at the expense of America’s strategic interests abroad. Indeed, he may well back away from strategic engagement with Asean, causing its members’ relationships with the United States to deteriorate.
To be sure, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines may prefer a US president who does not trouble himself to criticize their governments’ human rights abuses, corruption, or constitutional shenanigans. But US relations with other countries in the region may stall, if not deteriorate, as confidence in Trump’s willingness to follow through on US commitments collapses.
Economic ties are also likely to suffer. Under Trump, who has revealed strong protectionist tendencies, the TPP will stay moribund, at best. The US-Asean Connect initiative, which Obama proposed at the summit earlier this year, and which aims to boost America’s economic engagement with the regional grouping, may also go nowhere.
Besides Southeast Asia, Australia, India and Japan—key US allies and security partners in the Asia-Pacific region—may also find it difficult to connect with Trump.
One Asian country that may welcome the election’s outcome: China. Though Trump has criticized China extensively for supposedly stealing American jobs—and even blamed it for creating the “hoax” of climate change—he may take a softer stance on Chinese strategic expansionism in the region, especially in the South China Sea, than Obama did.
In a far-fetched but not implausible scenario, Trump may even strike a deal with China over its territorial claims, disregarding the interests of US allies, from Japan to the Philippines.
The good news is that this outcome is not guaranteed. Campaign rhetoric is one thing; governing is quite another. Once in the White House, a heavily advised Trump may realize that maintaining some continuity in America’s foreign policy, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, is more in line with US interests than the alternative. If nothing else, Trump may resist the idea of China gaining strategic primacy in the region.
For Trump, who made his career in real estate, perhaps the best way to look at it is in business terms. The United States would be remiss to squander all the significant investment that his predecessor has made in Southeast Asia. Project Syndicate
Le Hong Hiep is a fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, and author of the forthcoming book “Living Next to the Giant: The Political Economy of Vietnam’s Relations with China under Doi Moi.”
