Is Asean becoming irrelevant?
THE OUTCOME of the recent three-day summit of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Vientiane, Laos, is another proof that the regional grouping is inutile in standing up to China in the maritime row affecting four of its members.
As expected, the joint communiqué issued after the summit, which was also attended by Asean’s dialogue partners, including China and the United States, failed to mention the July 12 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that invalidated China’s territorial claim over almost the entire South China Sea.
The Philippines, along with Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei Darussalam, has claimed parts of the islands, shoals, reefs and atolls that straddle the South China Sea.
China has adamantly refused to respect the ruling of the arbitral court in the case filed by the Philippines despite its being a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) that binds member-countries to respect each other’s exclusive economic zones.
As in previous Asean summits, the Vientiane communiqué is couched in such gobbledygook as “reaffirming the importance of maintaining and promoting peace, security and stability in the region, as well as to the peaceful resolution of disputes, including full respect for legal and diplomatic processes, without resorting to the threat or use of force…”
Through the years, during their frequent meetings capped by a yearly summit, Asean officials have often engaged in palaver rather than dwelt on substantive issues. The meetings merely afforded photo ops for the grouping’s leaders and resulted in the issuance of long, vapid and repetitive communiqués.
According to Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay, the lack of a direct mention of the Philippines’ victory in the arbitration case against China in the draft of the Vientiane communiqué, which the Asean foreign ministers earlier approved and which was adopted in toto by the Asean Summit, does not necessarily mean a diplomatic victory for China.
“This is a victory for Asean for upholding the principles of international law,” Yasay said in a televised press briefing at the Department of Foreign Affairs after the communiqué was released. He said Asean had affirmed that it would resolve maritime disputes through international law, particularly under the Unclos.
What Yasay said is mere diplomatese because clearly, China notched another victory in Asean’s failure to cite the arbitral decision that China considers void ab initio.
But the Vientiane communiqué is a slight improvement from the one issued after the Phnom Penh summit in 2012, when the Cambodian government refused to even mention the South China Sea in the final document.
Shortly after the 2012 summit, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen candidly admitted that his country had made a “strategic choice” in China’s favor by completely ignoring the South China Sea issue. He said his country would block any common position by Asean on the maritime row, which was what China had explicitly demanded from its surrogates.
Laos and Cambodia, two poor, landlocked countries, are practically China’s vassals since they are dependent on it for millions of dollars in soft loans for their development and infrastructure projects.
Another issue that has been given the runaround by China is the declaration for the adoption of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, which was first broached in 2002 and formalized in the 29th Asean Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta on July 20-21, 1996. In 1999, Asean and China agreed on the need for such a Code of Conduct “which will lay the foundation for long-term stability in the area and foster understanding among claimant-countries.”
Asean and China agreed that the adoption of the Code of Conduct would further promote peace and stability in the region and pledged to work, on the basis of consensus, “toward the eventual attainment of this objective.”
But after more than 10 years, Asean and China are still talking about the issue, with both sides “reaffirming” at every summit that they would work for the “adoption” of a Code of Conduct. China’s dilly-dallying tactics are focused on the implementation of the declaration first rather than on moving forward with the Code of Conduct itself.
China has insisted that the problem in the South China Sea does not involve all Asean countries; thus, it will only negotiate on the issue with the relevant individual parties, not with Asean as a whole.
With China’s intransigence regarding the ruling of the arbitral court, it is doubtful whether China will ever agree to adopt and implement a Code of Conduct to lessen the tension in the area and finally resolve the maritime issue to the satisfaction of all claimant-countries.
Alito L. Malinao is a former diplomatic reporter and news editor of the Manila Standard. He now teaches journalism part-time at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, and is the author of the book “Journalism for Filipinos.”
