Edsa and governmental legitimacy
In mid-February 1986, the Filipino people did not have a clear idea of the result of the snap election of Feb. 7. The Feb. 9 walkout of 35 Commission on Elections tabulators, alleging that their work was being manipulated to favor Ferdinand Marcos, was quite alarming. But how many people in the country readily learned about the walkout, considering the Marcos regime’s control over the media?
The SWS-Ateneo national survey of May 2-June 2, 1986, showed public regard for the Comelec as tepid and barely favorable. To the statement, “In the last election, the Comelec performed its job independently,” 39 percent agreed, 33 percent disagreed, and the rest were undecided or did not answer. The Comelec count was, of course, the basis for the official Batasang Pambansa ruling that Marcos got 53.6 percent, and Cory Aquino only 46.1 percent, of the votes.
On the other hand, the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel), having observed 70 percent of the counting in the field, found 52.6 percent for Cory, and only 47.4 percent for Marcos.
That Namfrel was more credible to the people than the Comelec is shown by the SWS-Ateneo item: “Namfrel helped a lot in making the 1986 election clean,” to which 65 percent agreed and only 15 percent disagreed. (I congratulate the Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office for publishing both the Comelec and the Namfrel results in the Philippine Electoral Almanac of 2015, pages 132-134.)
But how many people in the country would have readily known of the divergence of the Namfrel count from the Comelec count, when most of the media were trumpeting victory for Marcos?
“In your opinion, which of the following gave the government now headed by Pres. Cory Aquino the right to govern?” was the question asked by the SWS-Ateneo survey, and by far the most popular response was “The strength of the civilian people or ‘People Power’,” which got 67 percent. In far second place was “The real winner of the last election,” which got only 14 percent. Thus was Edsa, which everyone knew about, a greater factor than the snap election in legitimizing the Cory Aquino government.
Minor responses as to the source of legitimacy of the Cory government were: the support of the Catholic Church, 6 percent; the support of patriotic military elements, 6 percent; the support of the American government, 4 percent; the support of other foreign governments, 1 percent; and the support of communist rebels, 0.2 percent.
When asked who won the snap election in their own precincts, 70 percent said it was Cory, and 26 percent said it was Marcos. But the respondents could not have seen for themselves the results in precincts other than their own.
The SWS-Ateneo survey asked: “We realize every citizen has the right to keep in confidence who he or she voted as president in the last election. But we would like to know the true count. Can you please write your vote on this piece of paper, where nobody can see, and drop it into this box?”
By this so-called ballot-box technique, the survey found the Cory votes at 64 percent and the Marcos votes at 27 percent. Nine percent were blanks.
The correctional moves of the Cory government were popular. This is clear with respect to six of seven moves tested by the May 1986 survey (missing balances from 100 percent are the undecided):
(1) “Confiscation of Marcos’ ‘hidden wealth’”: agree 64 percent, disagree 14 percent. (2) “Freezing wealth and properties of Marcos cronies”: agree 55 percent, disagree 20 percent. (3) “Abolition of the Batasang Pambansa”: agree 49 percent, disagree 28 percent. (4) “Forced resignation of Comelec commissioners”: agree 46 percent, disagree 27 percent. (5) “Replacement of elected officials with appointed officers-in-charge”: agree 43 percent, disagree 31 percent. (6) “Forced resignation of Supreme Court Justices”: agree 42 percent, disagree 31 percent.
The one move that had no consensus was “Release of detained top Communist Party leaders,” to which 37 percent agreed and 34 percent disagreed.
Cory’s “reconciliation with justice” was also popular. When the SWS-Ateneo survey asked if Cory’s treatment of Marcos’ friends and supporters was too lenient (labis na mapagbigay), just right (tama lang), or too severe (labis na mahigpit), it found the just-right percentage at 69, and the too-lenient and too-severe percentages at 12 and 13 respectively. Balances from 100 were nonresponses.
Regarding treatment of the New People’s Army and communists, the percentages of just-right, too-lenient and too-severe were 67, 17 and 7. As to treatment of Muslim rebels and the Moro National Liberation Front, the respective percentages were 67, 14, and 8.
The survey found 60 percent satisfied, and 7 percent dissatisfied, with the performance of Cory as president. Net satisfaction of +53 is Very Good (between +50 and +69).
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Five years later, the October 1991 conference of the Philippine Statistical Association featured the paper “On predicting the winners” by Rosario A. Henares of the Asia Research Organization (ARO). This paper revealed that a commissioned ARO survey of Feb. 1-5, 1986, had found 42 percent for Cory, 41 percent for Marcos, and 17 percent undecided.
Ms Henares’ paper reported her judgement that the undecided were also pro-Cory but afraid to say it openly. So she put Cory’s votes at 60 percent. She was not allowed to disclose the sponsor’s identity. (See my “The history of the 1986 electoral surveys,” Manila Chronicle, 11/30/1991; it is in my book “The Philippine Social Climate,” Anvil Publishing, 1994.)
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