An American ‘Mamasapano’
In the annals of modern American military warfare, there are a few battles that are best forgotten not because they represent defeats, but because victory came at such high costs in terms of lives lost as well as its impact on foreign policy decisions in later years.
In 1993, the United Nations, led by US forces, was involved in a humanitarian relief effort in Somalia, code-named Operation Restore Hope. The operation was aimed at creating a democratic state and establishing a government of national reconciliation in the country. One Somali faction, led by Mohammed Farrah Aidid, refused to cooperate and proceeded to attack UN forces in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia.
After a US military vehicle was destroyed by Somali fighters, killing four soldiers, President Bill Clinton ordered the deployment of a special task force composed of US Army Rangers and Delta Force operatives. The unit, named Task Force Ranger, consisted of 140 elite US troops under the command of Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison, commander of the Joint Special Operations Command at the time.
General Garrison was not a military academy graduate. He started out as a buck private in the army, and served two tours in Vietnam as part of the Phoenix program that ferreted out and killed Viet Cong village leaders. For him, soldiery was about fighting—killing the enemy before they killed you. He inspired loyalty and affection by not taking himself seriously, and he was a great storyteller with the ability to laugh at himself.
Operation Gothic Serpent was fought on Oct. 3 and 4 of 1993 in Mogadishu between US forces supported by UN elements from Pakistan and Malaysia, and Somali militiamen loyal to Farrah Aidid, assisted by armed civilian fighters. On Sunday, Oct. 3, Task Force Ranger, in eight Black Hawk and eight Little Bird helicopters, moved to capture Aidid’s close associates Omar Salad and Mohammed Awale. The attacking force was dropped into the heart of Mogadishu in the middle of a busy Sunday afternoon. It was a complex, difficult and dangerous assignment. After the assault began, Somali fighters shot down two Black Hawk helicopters and damaged three others, using rocket-propelled grenades. The survivors remained near the crash site and an urban battle ensued during the night. The mission was supposed to take about an hour; instead, a large portion of the assault force was stranded in a hostile city, surrounded and fighting for their lives. What surprised the attackers was the size, the scope and ferocity of Aidid forces that undertook a counterattack. There was a failure of intelligence.
Before a rescue force could extricate them, the death toll from the 48-hour operation came up to 18 Americans killed and 73 wounded. The dead bodies were mutilated and paraded through the street, dragged by jeering mobs.
While the arrest of the two associates of Aidid was accomplished, it was, of course, a Pyrrhic victory. News of the casualties and pictures of Somalis abusing American corpses resulted in outrage and revulsion at home, embarrassing the White House.
A Senate investigation followed, with several days of congressional hearings that produced a partisan report blaming President Clinton and Defense Secretary Les Aspin. Apparently, defense officials earlier failed on a request for Abrams tanks and Bradley armored vehicles for the task force. Secretary Aspin would resign two months later, taking much of the blame for his decision to refuse the request for the armored vehicles.
In his New York Times bestseller “Black Hawk Down,” an account of the Mogadishu firefight, Mark Bowden recounts the testimony of the father of Sgt. Casey Joyce, one of the Rangers killed. “Why were they denied armor, these forces? Had there been armor, had there been Bradleys there, I contend that my son would probably be alive today because he, like the other casualties that were sustained in the early phases of the battle, were killed en route from target to the downed helicopter site. I believe there was an inadequate force structure from the very beginning.”
Garrison would take full responsibility for the outcome of the battle. In a handwritten letter to President Clinton, he stated, “The mission was a success. Targeted individuals were captured and extracted from the target. For this particular target, President Clinton and Secretary Aspin need to be taken off the blame line.”
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Fallout from the Mogadishu tragedy: “The ghosts of Somalia continue to haunt US policy.” It ended an unprecedented UN effort to salvage a nation lost in anarchy and civil war, with millions of people starving. The lack of response in Rwanda (that could have prevented genocide) was (due to) the fear of getting involved in something like Somalia all over again.
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Today the Philippine National Police board of inquiry is set to submit its final report on the Mamasapano incident. It is basically an inquiry made by subordinates into the actions and decisions carried out by superior officers. And even this report is subject to further review by Malacañang before it can be released to the public.
Remember the Luneta hostage crisis? The report and recommendations made by Justice Secretary Leila de Lima were subjected to review by Malacañang and almost nothing substantial resulted from the entire process. It is very likely that the PNP report will suffer a similar fate.
Today the Bangsamoro Basic Law is in danger of being set aside or possibly watered down to a point of being unacceptable to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Questions regarding its constitutionality are being raised, but the shadow of Mamasapano is clearly casting a dark cloud over the entire proceedings.
The above Pyrrhic victories in Mogadishu and Mamasapano have generated unforeseen implications on the national security strategies of the United States and the Philippines.
