‘Untrue, speculative’ view on RH, power rate cases
Thank you for Peter Wallace’s views on two cases pending before the Supreme Court, as expressed in a portion of his column “DICT is not addition” (Opinion, 2/6/14), specifically on the reproductive health and power rate increase petitions.
In his column, he wrote that “[t]he Supreme Court, by not deciding on the petitions against the Reproductive Health Act, is placing itself superior to its constitutionally mandated coequal partners. And is denying the public its expressed wishes.” He then referred to 70 percent of the public (without providing a basis for this figure) wanting family planning and information and support for it and then connecting the RH Law to family planning, and finally he proceeded to accuse the Supreme Court of “sitting” on the case, i.e., intentionally delaying adjudication. It appears that his initial conclusion that the Court has not decided on the RH petitions is tied up to his accusation that the Court is deliberately delaying the case.
We respect his views, though we do not agree with them. In the same spirit of mutual respect for free expression of views, we take exception to the logic, the conclusion and the accusation.
The accusation that the Court is sitting on the case simply because it has yet to decide on the 19 live cases (14 petitions against, five interventions in favor) is untrue and unfair. There is simply no factual basis to support this.
The Court is duty bound to uphold the rule of law which, at the minimum, requires that it consider each case based on its intrinsic merits, and not simply on a facial review, with the deliberation and discernment as may be required to resolve each case. For this reason, the time it takes for each case to be decided would differ.
As with all processes, an amount of delay is inevitable and certainly excusable; what is inexcusable would be undue delay, not simply any delay. Under the circumstances, we may consider that there are 14 petitions challenging the law, five interventions seeking to uphold it, thus making 19 active cases to be read, deliberated upon and decided on. Oral arguments were heard on five separate dates (July 9, 23, Aug. 6, 13 and 27); at the end of the last public hearing, the Court gave each party 60 days to submit their respective memorandum, after which the Court would consider the cases submitted for resolution with or without the memorandum. The 60th day fell due on Oct. 28, 2013. The memoranda were submitted on various dates, with the earliest submitted on July 8, 2013, and the latest on Dec. 5, 2013.
It has been less than four months since the 60th day lapsed, even less if we consider the date on which the Solicitor General, counsel for the respondents in this case, submitted his memorandum. Under the circumstances, considering the number of petitions challenging and interventions seeking to uphold the RH Law and the importance of the issues presented, a period of less than four months cannot be considered unreasonable delay in resolving this case. He may also note that the constitutional obligation he referred to provides for a period of two years from date of submission for the Supreme Court to decide on each case. As far as the RH Law is concerned, we are nowhere near that period.
As for his comments on the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on the power rate increases and the supposed effects of any alleged delay, these are purely and grossly speculative and will not be addressed. It suffices only to state that the TRO is narrowly drawn and clearly stated as to the period covered by the restraint. As stated very clearly in the TRO, it only covers the matters raised in Meralco’s Dec. 5, 2013, letter and does not refer to any cost that may have been incurred thereafter, including generation charges for December 2013 and thereafter. On that basis, the threat of brownouts arising from any supposed overreach of the TRO is not only unfair but also baseless.
Please be assured that the Court is well aware of its role in the constitutional order of things. It is acutely aware that it is not an elected body and thus exercises the highest degree of discretion in considering constitutional issues that involve acts of the two other branches of government. That it is not an elected entity, however, does not give the Court license or luxury of shirking its duty to consider seriously any constitutional challenge, deliberate on its relative merits and decide on it within the period that the Constitution provides. That is what the Court is doing in the RH and power rate increase cases.
—THEODORE O. TE,
assistant court administrator
and chief, PIO, Supreme Court
