Marred?
PRESIDENT BENIGNO AQUINO III’S appointment of running mate Mar Roxas as chief of staff still needs an enabling administrative order, but it has already stirred the proverbial hornet’s nest. Much of the criticism seems to be ultimately based on the notion that, because Roxas lost the vice-presidential race, he should not be appointed to political office. This is a narrow view of political responsibility, based on the over-broad position that defeated candidates have been “rejected by the people.”
Is it in fact the case that election losers should not be named to appointive offices at all? We cannot find a sanction for this extreme view either in the Constitution or in a hundred years of Philippine politics. There is, however, an excellent constitutional provision imposing a temporary, one-year ban; contrary to what one may expect, this provision is found not in the section governing elections or in the section on the accountability of public officers, but in the section providing for a stronger civil service.
Article IX, Part B, Section 6 reads: “No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.”
Now why is that? The provision is meant to safeguard government service, by preventing it from being turned into a catch-all for suddenly jobless politicians. But if that is the case, why limit the ban to one year? Because democracy itself is sustained by a firm belief in the second chance. One year ought to be enough time for a defeated candidate to learn the lessons of defeat; for the burden of ordinary citizenship to leave an imprint on an ex-politician; above all, for public opinion to begin to change its mind.
To be sure, there is a type of appointment that should not be made even after the one-year ban: When a defeated candidate is appointed to a position that undermines the intent of the election that sent him to his defeat. A mayor turned out of city hall, for example, should not be appointed to an office that would allow him to counter the work of his successor. To sharpen the example: A defeated candidate for either mayor of Olongapo or a congressional district in Zambales should not be named chair of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, which plays an inordinate role in local politics, before the next election; that would be to mock the electorate in Olongapo or Zambales.
The case with defeated candidates for national office is a little more ambiguous. It did not seem right then, and it still doesn’t seem right now, that Gloria Arroyo appointed defeated senatorial candidate Prospero Pichay to head the Local Water Utilities Administration; the loyal Pichay was merely being rewarded for spending millions of his money on a futile bid for the Senate. If Sen. Manny Villar had won the presidency, should he have appointed (badly) beaten senatorial candidate Satur Ocampo to high office? Considering that the two candidates sometimes found themselves at cross-purposes during the campaign, the answer would seem to be: It depends on the office. (Here’s an intriguing counter-factual: What if Ocampo were appointed chair of the Commission on Human Rights?)
Appointment as reward; appointee as aligned policy-wise with the appointing power. Perhaps we can use these two touchstones as one measure with which to determine whether an appointment should be welcomed or not. The naming of a defeated candidate as a political reward (payback, is the long and short of it) runs counter to the public interest; on the other hand, the naming of a defeated candidate because he shares the exact same political views of the President and is bound to the same commitments the President campaigned on, is to honor the President’s own election mandate.
It is on this basis that Roxas’ entry into the President’s official family should be understood: He has a role to play in fulfilling the campaign promises he and President Aquino made.
There is of course the possibility that the unfortunate division of the higher echelons of the Aquino administration into two factions will be exacerbated with the appointment. That is the President’s own lookout. But, in truth, the crisis is inevitable; either there will be an all-out confrontation, or reconciliation. If Roxas’re-appearance on the scene will hasten the moment of resolution, then so be it.
